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How did Chinese merchants remedy opportunism in a prevailing 
scenario of weak state enforcement during the Spanish period in the 
Philippines? The paper attempts to analyze 19
th
 century historical 
accounts in elucidating how the utilization of guanxi sanctions pro- 
vides useful insights in addressing the gap between state enforcement 
and property rights violation. These sanctions constitute informal 
enforcement among Chinese merchants based on personalistic ties. 
With credible enforcement, Chinese principals could manage networks 
that facilitated merchandize trade throughout the Philippines. By 
the 19
th
 century, Chinese networks consisting of Chinese merchants 
and agents became crucial in large scale wholesale and retail trade.
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I. Introduction
When Chinese migrants reached the Philippines, they discovered the 
vast commercial opportunities that came with the coming of the Spanish. 
Instead of transacting with individual pre-Spanish polities at port, access 
to commerce in the entire archipelago was now possible under a com- 
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mon colonial policy. The challenge was, the exchange environment was 
marked by weak property rights enforcement and worse it was predatory 
against the Chinese― formally and informally. Institutional action against 
the Chinese included trade restrictions, banning of commerce, segrega- 
tion, expulsions, massacres and various financial levies. With the onset 
of the colonial economy, the potential economic gains were high but so 
was the exchange risk.
Wickberg (1965, p. 68-9) analyzed 19
th century Chinese commerce in 
the islands and finds that it was contingent on a combination of char- 
acteristics associated with success (e.g. patience, pioneering spirit); the 
deft utilization of credit; and an effective economic organization. However, 
Wickberg gave more importance on the use of financing and ‘patronage 
organization’ as factors in Chinese success.1 This paper focuses on the 
manner with which the Chinese organized themselves informally. In 
particular, we look at guanxi, a Chinese social construct based on per- 
sonalistic ties, as a source of informal sanctions that stabilized contracts.
A. The context of guanxi as a social construct
Rooted in Confucian ethics (King 1991), guanxi is known in China as 
a ‘way to get things done,’ which refers to relational modes in dealing 
with people. The meaning of the word guanxi has many dimensions 
(Tsui, Farh, and Xin 2000). Guanxi denotes a state of connectedness 
among parties. In regard to relationships in particular, guanxi can refer 
to the quality of relations shared by parties. On the other hand, guanxi 
can also refer to the parties in the relationship such as the individual, 
the firm, connected parties and even a network (Chen and Chen 2004). 
The common factor in the various definitions is the reference to a type 
of interpersonal relationship that involves particularistic elements (King 
1991). This paper refers to guanxi as a personalistic tie based on com- 
mon experience or heritage such as kinship, dialect or geographical origin. 
Contracts based on these ties are defined as guanxi contracts while net- 
works in which the enforcement of agreements operates are referred to 
as guanxi networks (Jacobs 1980; Tsui, Farh, and Xin 2000; Chen and 
Chen, 2004; Landa, 1998). Punishment or retribution based on guanxi 
1 Comprehensive quantification of Chinese success remains an empirical inquiry. 
Where Chinese mestizos (i.e. mixed race) are concerned, Comyn (1810, p. 39-40) 
acknowledges the accumulation of sums of money but the ‘amount, distribution, 
or the secret places in which they are hoarded’ are not possible to determine. 
The lack of documentation is worse for the non-mestizo Chinese.
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shall be referred to as guanxi sanctions.
Guanxi becomes significant as we are concerned with how Chinese 
merchants in the Philippines used informal sanctions in protecting con- 
tracts from the propensity to violate agreements (i.e. the commitment 
problem). These sanctions are based on deliberate particularization of 
exchange relations within ties of kinship and ethnicity (Landa 1981, 
1999).
　　　
B. Guanxi as Informal Enforcement
We consider guanxi sanctions as enforcement in the context of under- 
developed institutions in the exchange environment. The literature under- 
scores that alternative enforcement mechanisms arise as substitutes for 
inadequate property rights protection utilized by economic players. Ex- 
amples of enforcement alternatives abound, as seen in corporate gov- 
ernance networks to compensate for weak laws (Klapper and Love 2004; 
Berglof and Claessens 2004); inter-firm governance against opportunism 
(Aviram 2003); mafia networks (Anderson and Bandiera 2001; Hendley, 
Murrell, and Ryterman 2000); market broker systems (Gabre-Madhin 
1999); community responsibility systems (Greif 1997); and merchant 
coalitions in twelfth to thirteenth century Europe (Milgrom, North, and 
Weingast 1990) and pre-modern Japan (Okazaki 2001). Landa’s (1981; 
1999) analysis on the Ethnically Homogeneous Chinese Middleman Group 
(EHMG), Grief’s (1993) formal approach on the Maghribi traders’ coalition 
and North’s (1981) work on economic history provide the foundations of 
this article. This paper considers sanctions based on guanxi as consti- 
tuting an informal enforcement mechanism, which remedies opportunism 
where state sanctions are weak. In this sense, the paper seeks to enrich 
the discourse beyond the traditional “firms-and-markets” paradigm (e.g. 
see Jwa 2002) and attempts to provide a perspective through which his- 
torical outcomes can be analyzed. 
C. Outline of the Essay
The succeeding sections are outlined as follows. Section II briefly intro- 
duces the scenario of the state enforcement apparatus, which is found 
weak and worse, predatory against the Chinese. Section III delves into 
patterns of commercial relations among Chinese traders in 19
th century 
trade. We explore the themes of ethnic particularization in the principal- 
agent context as well as merchant cooperation. These aspects provide 
major themes in understanding the use of guanxi. Section IV focuses 
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on the features of guanxi sanctions, which are informal remedies to in- 
adequate state enforcement. The main themes of the section are network 
restrictedness and the forms of punitive action when agreements are 
violated. Section V extends the analysis by exploring the intertwined 
fates of the expanding import-export trade, large-scale credit and Chinese 
commercial networks. As a point for further research, section V ends 
with how guanxi fits into this picture. Section VI provides the conclu- 
sion, which covers the perspective on guanxi’s place in Philippine eco- 
nomic history as well as implications of the historical study on the pre- 
sent context.
II. The Dilemma: Weak State Enforcement and Opportunism
The institutional context in Spanish Philippines is described by weak 
state enforcement throughout the colonial period. Comyn (1810) captures 
the conflict of interest among Spanish authorities in his account of magis- 
trates advancing their own personal interests as they became ‘the chief 
consumers, purchasers, and exporters of everything produced and manu- 
factured within the districts under their command, thus converting 
their license to trade into a positive monopoly.’ However, in regard to 
the Chinese, enforcement was not just weak but also predatory. Attempts 
to control Chinese influence took the form of commercial restrictions, 
financial impositions, segregation, expulsions and massacres ever since 
the earliest times of Chinese migration to colonial Philippines. Historical 
accounts of these are replete and well documented in the literature 
(Blair and Robinson 1903-1909; Liao 1964; Purcell 1965; Wickberg 1965; 
Felix 1966, 1969).
Documentary evidence states that the Spanish colonial government set 
up a parian― a locality outside Manila that segregated unassimilated 
Chinese or those not baptized into Catholicism from the rest of the 
population. The parian represented the measure of control imposed on 
the mobility of Chinese in the Philippines. However, the parian became 
self-supporting and thrived with commercial transactions (Guerrero 
1966, p. 27). 
From a legal standpoint, the intention of the segregation measure 
was benevolent. That is, it was in the context of protecting the Chinese 
from acts of abuse from the administration in particular and non-Chinese 
population in general.2 In Morga’s work of 1609, he explained that the 
2 Interestingly, while the official position was benevolent, there were other views 
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parian was headed by a Chinese governor who is appointed to address 
legal cases of civil and commercial nature among fellow Chinese. Also, 
appeals could be forwarded to the parian’s magistrate of trade, and can 
be further elevated to the Audiencia de Manila (Spanish high court in 
Manila), which functioned as a Supreme Court (Rizal 1962, p. 346). How- 
ever, the actual condition in the parian reflected the overall weakness 
in legal enforcement in the Philippines, consistent with MacMicking’s 
(1967) observation during the 19
th century of the ‘dilatoriness of the 
law.’ 
Spain put in place a series of policies in the early 17
th century to 
institutionalize protection of the Chinese. The royal decree of April 15, 
1603 appointed the Governor-General as protector of the Chinese. Philip 
II passed into law a modified version of this policy in June 12, 1614. 
The law gave the fiscal of the Audiencia the function of giving legal advice 
to the parian’s alcalde. However, the office was saddled with compromises 
in terms of extortions and bribes. In the end, the fiscal had to be re- 
placed (Guerrero 1966, pp. 30-1; Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV 1903- 
1909, p. 155). Parian governance, therefore, which was meant to provide 
a third party enforcement for the Chinese community, turned out to be 
ineffective and at times was used for expropriation. Beyond the parian, 
the institutional environment likewise, could not be depended on. 
III. A Glimpse of Chinese Commercial Relations in 
Nineteenth Century Trade
This section investigates two factors in the use of guanxi sanctions in 
commerce: ethnic particularization and collusion. Historical accounts 
document the former in relation to the principal-agent context while the 
latter is documented as strategic behavior among merchants. As docu- 
mentary evidence shows, these factors are most observable by outsiders 
in the arrangements they are associated with due to the issues that 
arise within those arrangements. In particular, the crowding out of non- 
Chinese competition through the cabecilla’s network of agents was an 
oft-repeated issue. In the case of merchant collusion, it was uniform 
on allowing Chinese self-governance. Tavora (1903-1909, pp. 251-2) derogatorily 
opined for instance that it would be best for the Chinese to govern themselves 
because only their laws can deal with their behavior. If Spaniards were to govern 
the Chinese, this would require conforming to their ways, which was considered 
untenable.
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pricing and other forms of cooperation that got the attention of outsiders. 
While the violation of price-fixing agreements is not the type of oppor- 
tunism that can be punished by the state, even if state enforcement were 
strong, we nevertheless explore it here to elucidate the workings of mer- 
chant cooperation and punitive implications of not keeping agreements. 
A. Ethnic Particularization in a Principal-Agent Context
During the 19th century, the position of Chinese traders evolved. Sir 
John Bowring (1963, p. 111) noted the domination of Chinese traders 
as they evolved from petty traders in the beginning of Spanish coloni- 
zation, into wholesale merchants who engaged in large-scale export and 
import trade in the 19
th century. He observed that Chinese traders in- 
deed utilized agents scattered over most of the Philippine islands. Indeed, 
in the 19
th century, the Chinese merchants established themselves as 
cabecillas. Following Wong (1999, p. 151), a cabecilla is the firm’s prin- 
cipal, who is involved in the large-scale trade of import-export goods. 
The cabecilla engaged with Manila-based foreign mercantile houses. The 
cabecilla’s retail stores were distributed all over the islands and were 
operated by his various agents. The agents were tasked to sell imported 
goods and gather crops for export through the trade houses. The cabecilla 
extended credit to the agents, supplied goods, and found buyers for the 
local produce they bought.  
Robert MacMicking’s (1967) recollections of his travels to Manila in 
the mid-19
th century astutely describe several significant points. The first 
important observation is on the domination of Chinese merchants over 
the provincial trade in manufactured goods. MacMicking noted the nu- 
merous Chinese shops operating across the islands. Second, Chinese 
shops that operated throughout the islands were run by Chinese agents 
employed by Chinese principals, establishing the ethnic particulariza- 
tion of the principal-agent contract. Third, the Chinese agent kept the 
Chinese principal informed of the needs of the store while the principal 
made wholesale purchases in Manila and sent these goods to the pro- 
vincial shops. Elsewhere, MacMicking made specific note of the remu- 
neration structure in the principal-agent contract between the Chinese 
business owner and Chinese employee. He noted that the effort level of 
Chinese agents is maximized when remuneration is a profit share rather 
than a fixed wage. This affirms that indeed, a principal-agent contract 
existed and there was ethnic particularization. 
The principal-agent relationship between cabecilla and Chinese agent 
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can further be characterized through the sari-sari store, a retail outlet 
that sold a variety of basic goods that are purchased in small quantities. 
The proliferation of sari-sari stores in the context of the cabecilla’s op- 
eration may be traced to the second half of the 1800s. Grass root sari- 
sari storekeepers who functioned as agents of the cabecilla in a dual 
middleman role, were depended on for two roles. They did not only collect 
various commodities from producers. But they also engaged in the dis- 
tribution of products on retail. Hence, sari-sari storekeepers combined 
retailing and the collecting of produce (Wong 1999). The Chinese replaced 
mestizos and Filipinos as retailers, repeating the pattern of crowding 
out non-Chinese competition. These stores dominated retail trade all over 
the country (Bowring 1963, p. 109). 
Nicholas Loney, the British Vice-Consul for Iloilo province, wrote to 
W. Farren, the British Consul to the Philippines, on April 12, 1857. Loney 
reported the commercial traffic facilitated by Chinese agents in Iloilo. 
His report noted that of the thirty Chinese settled at the town of Molo, 
majority functioned as agents or partners of Manila Chinese. This cor- 
roborates MacMicking’s earlier reports. Loney described Iloilo Chinese 
to be travelling between Manila and Iloilo in carrying out merchandize 
distribution and collection. Collections were in the form of goods or cash 
(Loney 1967, pp. 232-3). 
In July 10, 1861, Loney related to Farren the situation in Iloilo wherein 
Chinese traders were supplanting mestizos in retail trade. Because com- 
petition with Chinese traders has made the retail trade unprofitable for 
non-Chinese competitors, mestizos who in Loney’s observation became 
superfluous, were turning to agriculture. The incentive to engage in agri- 
culture was further compounded by the fact that cultivation area and 
production had no institutional impediments for mestizos such as those 
that barred Chinese. The other interesting implication is, the criticism 
against the Chinese that they did not engage in agriculture, which was 
the basis of being permitted to penetrate the interior in the first place, 
was now less important. This is owing to the observation that Chinese 
commerce resulted in ‘displacing native capital less beneficially employed 
and transferring it to other ... more productive channels’ (Loney 1967, 
pp. 247-8). 
It is worth noting that the cabecilla-agent relationship was close and 
usually kept outside public scrutiny. This was understandable given 
that when dire commercial straits arise, secrecy protects both parties 
from liability. The extent of liability will depend on independent credit 
arrangements availed by each party, which are in turn affected by the 
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nature of the commercial relationship between cabecilla and agent and 
extent of operations each undertake. For instance, Chinese wholesalers 
could be import distributors and/or export produce collectors while 
Chinese retailers could be agent distributors of cabecillas and/or direct 
distributors of imports. Despite the secrecy recognized in the literature, 
the latter nevertheless observes strict adherence of agents to settle credit 
obtained from the cabecilla. This underscores the strength of implicit 
sanctions. That is, agents of Manila retail shops had to settle cash pay- 
ments on a weekly basis such that prices on Sundays were observed to 
be reduced so that price-elastic demand would result in the desired 
volume of sales3 (Wong 1999; Wickberg 1965).
Several points are underscored in this subsection. First is the existence 
of ethnic particularization of the principal-agent relationship between 
cabecillas and Chinese agents. The second is that inter-island trade 
was managed by the Chinese through a network of agents. Third, it was 
observed that Chinese traders supplanted non-Chinese competition. These 
three points are exemplified in an excerpt from the United States of 
America Philippine Commission (1900, pp. 441-2):
We can now judge how it is that the Chinese were always successful in 
the commercial competition, which they raised in the Philippines. To put it 
in one word, they were successful because there exists among them a 
cooperative protection incapable of being destroyed either by law or by any 
measures, which may be taken to counteract it. In fact, they succeed every- 
where in obtaining a monopoly of wholesale and retail trade, becoming by 
the unity of purpose which they possess the proprietors of mechanic arts 
and trades in the country. They lend each other cooperative aid and all 
work together for the same end, thus forming a vast commercial society with 
which it is impossible for other merchants who work separately to compete. 
Some foreign business houses established in Manila import dry goods from 
Europe and turn them over for prompt and certain sale to a small number 
of Chinese merchants, in whose power to collect the value of the merchandise 
they have confidence. These merchants divide the articles received among 
the shops of their countrymen and also send quantities of the goods to their 
principal agents in the provinces, who in turn distribute them among the 
different Chinese who have open shops in the towns and provincial capitals. 
They previously mark the prices on the articles and the shopkeepers are 
not allowed to reduce them under any pretext. Under this system the result 
is that although there may be many Chinese establishments in one town, 
3 Wickberg (1965, p. 72) cites Moya y Jimenez, Francisco de. “Las Islas Filipinas 
en 1882.” Revista de Espana, 93 (1883): 189 and Blumentritt, Ferdinand. “Die 
Chinesen Manilas.” Globus, 62 (1890): 100.
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the same article exists or may be secured in all of them, and the price is 
uniform in high and low alike and only follows a general rule, whether the 
article is plenty or scarce in the place.
B. Collusion among Chinese merchants
In the context of concerted action among cabecillas, we find that guanxi 
sanctions upheld collusion among merchants even after markets were 
Chinese-dominated. As early as August 4, 1628, Governor Tavora’s letter 
to Philip IV acknowledged two significant things: (1) A network among 
Chinese traders through which collusion existed; (2) An enforcement 
mechanism existed within that network, which maintained collusion. 
Shirking among merchants led to guanxi punishment, which was iden- 
tified in Tavora’s account as destruction of reputation― a very valuable 
intangible resource. The close-knit nature of networks facilitated repu- 
tational effects and hence, destruction of reputation was a credible threat. 
In particular, Governor Tavora (1903-1909, p. 250) described merchant 
collusion as follows: 
As they have control of all the merchandise, trading, gains, and mechanical 
trades of the country, their extreme readiness to scatter bribes is remarkable. 
There is no Spaniard, secular or religious, who obtains his food, clothing, 
or shoes, except through them. Consequently, there is scarce a Sangley4 
who does not have his protector. Among themselves they have great system 
and energy in all those of one trade acting together in all matters that 
affect them. They guard one another against the Spaniard to such an extent 
that, if I wish to change my shoemaker, I will not be able to find among all 
those engaged in that occupation another who will sell me a shoe. If anyone 
would dare to do so, the others upon his return to China would bring suit 
before their mandarins, and thus they would destroy him and all his re- 
latives.
In July 7, 1741, Justice Enriquez reported that Chinese merchants 
acted in unanimity in setting the same price for their merchandise so 
that a monopoly was observed and ‘it was not because the natives were 
not useful but because the Chinese confederated among themselves so 
that they did not mind losing a thousand pesos to bankrupt a few men 
who tried to get into a new business’ (Diaz-Trechuelo 1966, p. 196).5 
4 “Sangley” is a colloquial reference to a Chinese person.
5 Diaz-Trechuelo (1966, p. 196) cites Manila, July 7, 1741, Archivo General De 
Indias 202.
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This is indeed very significant documentary evidence because it explicitly 
described details of concerted action by merchants and the enforcement 
against deviance.
In the account of Manuel Bernaldez Pizarro (1903-1909, pp. 228-9) 
in April 26, 1827 on the needed reforms for the Philippines, the way 
the Chinese conducted business was also described. Below is Emma H. 
Blair’s annotation on the account. 
Their method of doing business is explained-practically the same as is 
done in the United States at the present time; united capital and effort, 
division of the gains accordingly, quick sales and small profits, etc. They 
have obtained the exclusive retail trade in Manila, and a great part of the 
wholesale trade, ‘and thereby have aroused the hostility of corporations and 
private persons, notwithstanding that they are a class of peaceable and in- 
dustrious people in the country.’
Sowell’s (1983, p. 46) contemporary work corroborates Blair’s recogni- 
tion of the parallel between Chinese organization in the Philippines and 
that of the United States. Sowell makes reference to the existence of an 
organized Chinese community in the United States akin, in turn, to what 
was in operation among overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Sowell 
describes that the community, which was known as the Six Companies 
or The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, was networked all 
the way to China and it also had enforcement mechanisms that were 
apart from formal institutions in mainstream society. The Six Companies 
was an enclosed group that functioned as a bloc.6 In the late 19
th cen- 
tury, Lala (1899, p. 106) observed that the Chinese in the Philippines 
indeed paid attention to protecting themselves through their own guilds, 
secret societies and courts. Incidentally, Blair noted this observation and 
referenced Lala in his annotation (Bernaldez Pizarro 1903-1909, p. 231).
Translating from Lannoy’s 1849 work, Wickberg (1965, p. 74) cites 
another set of interesting specifics on how the Chinese merchant co- 
operation worked. 
There prevails a broad unity of purpose among the Chinese merchants, 
who act in concert so as not to compete with each other in the purchase of 
merchandise from Europe, which they divide among themselves, and give to 
those of them who, being less known, or having a more restricted scope of 
6 Sowell (1983) cites the work of Chen, Jack (1980) The Chinese of America. 
San Francisco: Harper & Row. See pp. 27-8.
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business, do not enjoy the same trust in the foreign business houses.7
In one account, a group of Chinese textile merchants in the 1840s 
banded together to control prices and protect supply by standing as a 
bloc in bargaining with the European importers. The group operated 
until the middle of the 1880s (Wickberg 1965, p. 74).8 In this case, while 
collusion was present, it was not permanent and did not operate in the 
context of a guild as it was formed and known by the 1880s. The fol- 
lowing two accounts provide valuable information on cooperation through 
cabecilla organizations. In 1894-1895, the I Ho Chu Pu Shang Hui asso- 
ciation was formed to mobilize a commercially debilitating boycott against 
a German merchant for his legal sanctions against a Chinese textile 
merchant for debts incurred. The association along with two other textile 
merchant groups― Fu Lien I Pu Shang Hui and Kuan Ti Yeh Hui―
cooperated for a common emergency fund, while maintaining group auto- 
nomy. Further, guanxi was the factor that prevented Chinese merchants 
from attempting to monopolize supply or to engage in predatory price 
competition within the network. It also filled a pareto-improving role by 
ensuring that even merchants with limited scale of resources and busi- 
ness operations were able to benefit from network clout (Wickberg 1965, 
pp. 75-6).9
This pattern of in-group cooperation continued and was documented 
in the American period. For instance, in the 1920s, the grocery business 
of an American failed to sustain itself owing to the group advantage 
that the Chinese competitors used in demanding discounts from import- 
ers. The 5 to 15 percent discount the Chinese group was able to get from 
importers rendered the American’s grocery business unviable (Harper's 
Magazine 1950).
7 Wickberg (1965, p. 74) translates from Lannoy, J. (1849, p. 112) Iles Philippines, 
Bruxelles, Impr. de Delevigne et Callewaert.
8 The specific reference in Wickberg (1965, p. 74) corrects the cited pages in 
Clemen118).
9 We posit that persistence of collusion or in other words, the longevity of 
networks with enforcement mechanisms was not contingent on being formally 
organized. Collusion in the context of informal organizations was more prevalent 
in the exchange environment during most of the Spanish colonization period. 
However, in the late 19
th
 century when Chinese traders had more space to engage 
and predation was alleviated to a certain extent, formal organization was possible, 
with its attendant advantages.
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IV. The Remedy: Guanxi Sanctions
Even in the event that effort is observable, the agent’s commitment 
remains an issue owing to weak enforcement muscle on the part of the 
state. Appendix A presents an example of a contract design between the 
principal and agent where contract violation is inadequately addressed 
by existing formal enforcement from the state. The illustration adopts 
Fabella’s (2009) ‘exogenous cash in advance contract’ for the specification 
of the model. Appendix B introduces guanxi sanctions into the model 
and demonsrates theoretically how such sanctions remedy inadequate 
state enforcement.
The cabecilla will prefer to operate in a strong state enforcement con- 
text because contracts are cheaper. That is, it would take a higher wage 
inducement for the agent to abide by the contract as compared to the 
wage in a strong state enforcement context. In light of weak state sanc- 
tions, guanxi sanctions enter into commercial contracting to fill this en- 
forcement void. Given the enforcement picture during Hispanic times, the 
Chinese compensated for weak and predatory enforcement by resorting 
to personalistic ties (i.e. guanxi) in contracting. These ties carried implicit 
sanctions on deviant behavior. This section looks at three major points. 
First is the requirement of restrictedness in the network of commercial 
partners (i.e. agents and merchants). Second is a consolidated discussion 
of enforcement based on guanxi ties. Third is a discussion on the human 
capital implication of network restrictedness on commercial outcomes. 
A. Guanxi Increases with Homogeneity
Since guanxi refers to personalistic ties that are particular to Chinese, 
the existence of guanxi between cabecilla and agent is hinged on a re- 
stricted agent pool. Guanxi increases upon increased particularization 
of relationships, which is only possible when restriction is likewise in- 
creased. For instance, we can understand the intuition behind agent 
pool restriction through group homogeneity. The literature elucidates the 
different bases of guanxi such as kinship, hometown and place of work 
(Tsui and Farh 1997; Tsui, Farh, and Xin 2000; Jacobs 1980; Landa 
1981). With respect to the Chinese in the Philippines during the Spanish 
period, they were strongly homogenous in terms of hometown origin. 
That is, most migrants originated from Fujian province in China or the 
associated speech group, which in common parlance is referred to as 
Fukienese or Hokkien. Outside the unit of family, identification with lo- 
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cality of origin or hometown figures strongest as the basis for guanxi. 
The more homogenous the group, the more particularized personal ties 
are and hence the stronger guanxi is and in turn, informal sanctions 
(Landa 1981). The less restricted the group, ties become less personal, 
which decreases the effectiveness of sanctions based on guanxi. Chinese 
in the Philippines, at the onset of the 19
th century, were highly homo- 
geneous. Migrants from Fujian province possibly made up the majority 
of the Chinese population in the Philippines. This is also consistent 
with the fact that the junks bound for the Philippines sailed from 
Quanzhou or Xiamen, both located in Fujian. The Cantonese, who became 
part of the Chinese community after 1800, did not substantially alter 
the Chinese ethnic composition. It is worthy of note that these Chinese 
who did not originate from Fujian or did not belong to the Hokkien- 
Chinese speech group, organized their own homogeneous communities 
(Wickberg 1965, p. 38; Chu 2012). Chinese immigrants maintained their 
local identities owing to entrepreneurial motivations (Wang 2003), affinity 
to their culture (Bernal 1966) and the desire to return to their homeland 
(Pomerantz and Topik 2005). 
B. Guanxi Ties and Enforcement 
In contextualizing the enforcement feature of guanxi, reciprocity is an 
important tenet, which refers to ‘the give and take of objects, favours, 
obligations, debts, responsibilities and loyalties.’ Expected actions are at 
times well specified but often they are implicit and ‘felt’ (Hodder 1996, 
p. 52). In the sense of Albert Hirschman’s (1970) concept of ‘exit’ and 
‘voice,’ sanctions can be in the form of disgrace and blacklisting, respect- 
ively (Wong 1999). These measures, while not sponsored by the formal 
state enforcement apparatus, constitute viable punishment or retribution 
that can even be graver than formal punitive action. Amyot (1973, p. 
66) for instance aptly describes that ‘a Chinese dares not betray this 
trust or else he would be cut-off from all business associations should 
word get around.’ Amyot (1973, p. 119), further shares an interesting 
statement from a respondent in his research on familism among Manila 
Chinese. The respondent relates that his preference for working with his 
brothers is due to trust. He says that being swindled and getting away 
with it is not possible since his brothers are “tied” to him. 
It is important to underscore that in context of reciprocity, sanctions 
simply exist as the other side of trust. When a commercial relationship 
is contingent on guanxi ties, the betrayal of trust is tantamount to a 
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consequence. Weightman (1960) points out that a Chinese merchant 
with a good record would enjoy the ease of accessing loans from fellow 
Chinese but would suffer sanctions if he departs from uniform pricing 
and does not adhere to agreements. 
Aside from informal sanctions such as disgraced reputation, which is 
facilitated through word of mouth throughout the network, it is worth 
noting that in the American period, while the possibility of litigation 
became a viable avenue for enforcement, it was seen as a last resort. 
The less restricted particularization of business partners even among 
Chinese makes it more difficult to employ informal means as sanctions 
against violation of agreements. In addition, the American period saw 
the increased use of promissory notes and guarantors (Wong 1999). A 
resolution in 1934 for instance, was circulated in Chinese business circles 
in the Philippines. It detailed the sanctions against Chinese merchants 
who were deemed to have purposely avoided the settlement of credit. 
Not only were names and photographs spread throughout business net- 
works in the country, the individuals were also blacklisted (Wong 1999). 
Several points deserve attention. First, the nature of associations has 
evolved from how they were described in section III.B. There is more 
organization not just in terms of facilitating cooperative action but also 
carrying out sanctions on erring members. Second, betrayal from erring 
merchants in the network is not just felt by the aggrieved parties but 
also by others in the network. The non-aggrieved parties in the network 
derive disutility from knowing that they exerted cost in keeping agree- 
ments while others break them. In this light, carrying out sanctions now 
draws from a community motivation. Related to this, the detection of 
deliberately trying to escape obligations compounds the gravity of the 
sanctions owing to relational dimensions such as the absence of sensi- 
tivity and empathy. Third, litigation, although in consonance with state 
enforcement, is still done in consideration of the community’s effort to 
resolve the concern.
C. Human Capital Implication of Network Restrictedness
As Haley, Haley and Tan (2009) posit, the Chinese face competitive 
disadvantages associated with a restricted pool. These include compe- 
tency restricted to the home turf or the home market only; lack of checks 
and balances; proprietary capabilities, family limits and lack of profes- 
sionalization. However, the interesting context of Chinese traders in the 
Philippines during the Spanish period shows the opposite. Given the 
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particularities of the period, the Chinese derived the most advantage 
when the pool was absolutely restricted. As the agent pool becomes more 
restricted, human capital increases, which in turn results in a positive 
effect on revenue.
This essay recognizes an insight from Lim (1983), that ethnicity is 
irrelevant between the top and bottom levels of the economic structure.  
However, in the middle level of SMEs engaged in commercial and rela- 
tively simple industrial activities, ethnicity becomes important. The Chinese 
predicament during the 16
th to 19th century period in the Philippines fits 
this context. In terms of the index of restrictiveness, we see that the 
cabecilla would have the most advantage in relying on agents who were 
all Chinese. In the middle level of economic activity, more resources are 
required. Economic agents in the bottom level without resource access 
or a conduit such as guanxi, which also facilitates access to capital, 
credit, technology, find it difficult to enter into the middle level. This 
difficulty was the experience of the indigenous population. The transition 
from the middle level to the higher level requires the help of foreign 
firms and/or the state. It is interesting to note that during the latter 
half of the 19
th century, among the Chinese, this transition is best in- 
vestigated in the context of taipanism. Although this is beyond the scope 
of this study, documentary evidence show that major commercial relation- 
ships had to be built with non-Chinese. As we will demonstrate later in 
the cabecilla’s optimization problem with the guanxi element, we differ 
from Lim (1983), which considers ethnicity as a means of economic 
access while it is not considered an independent variable in the trader’s 
objective function. 
It is interesting to see that during the twilight of Spanish rule, the 
status of the cabecilla began to change as the economy gradually opened 
up. In other words, as the cabecilla transitioned into the top level of 
economic activity as Lim (1983) describes, the importance of restricting 
the agent pool changes. More players were required. In particular, the 
cabecillas built commercial relationships with foreign houses that allowed 
trade on credit while they relied on the cabecilla’s network of collection 
and distribution of goods. In this sense, the more restricted the agent 
pool becomes, aptitude deteriorates, negatively affecting the cabecilla’s 
profit. A rise in network restrictedness ambiguously affects the profit of 
the cabecilla and it becomes a challenge for the cabecilla to use guanxi 
discriminately. 
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V. Large-Scale Trade and Chinese Commercial Networks
The second half of the 19th century brought a new landscape of export- 
import trade where wholesaling and retailing offered tremendous oppor- 
tunities to traders. Foreign merchant houses entered the picture and 
needed a conduit to gather up export produce and distribute imports. 
The Chinese recognized this opportunity. Given the cabecillas’ commercial 
network, moving goods was not new to them. But because the scale of 
operations is so much greater than before, large-scale credit was crucial. 
Even without collateral, cabecillas were given access to the import-export 
business in partnership with foreign merchant houses due to the widely 
recognized Chinese commercial networks. In other words, these trade 
networks tipped commercial advantage towards cabecillas. And it is in 
this particular sense that these networks were essentially perceived to 
constitute the major requirement10 in the granting of large-scale credit. 
The first subsection below establishes the increased commercial traffic 
as a motivation in the changing demands of business operations. The 
second subsection gives attention to the role of large-scale credit in the 
new commercial picture. The last subsection explores the significance of 
Chinese networks in the import-export trade.
A. Foreign Merchant Houses and the Commercial Traffic
To demonstrate commercial traffic through foreign merchant houses 
we use export data from Castro (1982). Figure 1 shows that in the begin- 
ning of the 1840s until the end of the 19th century, British and American 
houses cornered Philippine exports while the Spanish in the Philippines 
suffered a decreasing share in the export pie. The data confirm the ob- 
servation of MacMicking (1967) in the second half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury that Spanish export commerce lagged behind that of foreign houses. 
To appreciate what specific commodities were most significant, Figure 2 
presents export data on the top two export produce of the Philippines―
abaca and sugar, which constituted the majority of the entire basket of 
exports. Data in Figure 3 show the share of England and the United 
States in raw abaca exports while Figure 4 shows the country shares in 
10 Widespread commercial networks became the major consideration for the 
granting of credit, which is analogous to collateral in a conventional context. In 
other words, Chinese networks were valued as ‘currency’ by foreign merchant 
houses and in this particular context are these networks referred to as ‘collateral 
substitutes.’
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Source: Compiled from data in Legarda (1999).
FIGURE 1
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE EXPORTS, 1818-1894 
(% OF TOTAL EXPORTS)
sugar exports. Taking Figures 2-4 together, we find that where abaca 
and sugar were concerned, England and the United States dominated 
for many years. At least in raw abaca exports, the domination was until 
1894 when the United States’ share exceeded that of England. In regard 
to sugar exports, both countries were front runners until 1876. In 1894, 
while the U.S. was not listed for sugar exports in Castro’s (1982) data 
set, the general pattern for 1894 remains. That is, non-Spanish houses 
and Western houses in particular, were the leaders in percentage shares 
in sugar exports.11 Hence, on the part of the Chinese, the ability to 
secure deals with non-Spanish houses and strategically, with British 
and American merchant houses, for many years was advantageous in 
cornering a bulk of the wholesale and retail market. 
11 Clemente (2010, p. 115) cited the substantial combined shares of England 
and the U.S. in sugar and raw abaca exports for the years 1856, 1876 and 1894. 
The combined shares are 56.9%, 67.4% and 48.46%, respectively. We correct the 
share attribution for 1894. That is, in Castro’s (1982) data for 1894, the U.S. is 
listed as the top exporter in raw abaca but is not listed for sugar exports. Never- 
theless, the material point remains that non-Spanish houses, in particular, Western 
countries, still cornered sugar exports in 1894.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS220
Source: Castro (1982).
FIGURE 2
TOP TWO PHILIPPINE EXPORTS, 1856, 1876, 1894 
(IN MILLIONS OF PESOS)
Source: Graph constructed from data in Castro (1982).
FIGURE 3
COUNTRY SHARE IN RAW ABACA EXPORTS, 1856, 1876, 1894 (%)
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Source: Graph constructed from data in Castro (1982).
FIGURE 4
COUNTRY SHARE IN SUGAR EXPORTS, 1856, 1876, 1894 (%)
B. Role of Credit in Large-Scale Trade
A hallmark of the latter half of 19th century commerce was the neces- 
sity of substantial credit in facilitating the breadth of operations in large- 
scale wholesaling and retailing. In MacMicking’s (1967, pp. 18-9) account 
below, the Chinese discovered the advantages of bulk-buying, which in 
turn was made possible by credit access. 
There is another advantage which the Chinese have found from the system 
they pursue―that large purchases of goods from the merchants who import 
them for sale are frequently able to buy them for less money than those 
smaller traders who are not in the habit of making purchases to the same 
amount from the importers―as the credit of a small dealer is not sufficiently 
good to induce a merchant to sell them more than he imagines he is likely 
to be paid for.
It was during this period that the Chinese trader transitioned into 
being large-scale wholesalers and retailers. As Bowring (1963, p. 111) 
aptly observed:
Of late, however, many are merging into the rank of wholesale dealers 
and merchants exporting and importing large quantities of goods on their 
own account, and having their subordinate agents scattered over most of 
the islands.
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When Europeans and Americans established mercantile houses in the 
Philippines, two major changes happened. First, the no-credit regime 
that the Chinese had to endure before 1850 became a thing of the past. 
Second, the foreign houses drew from their connections with international 
financial centers, thereby accessing a large amount of capital. In June 
26, 1899, R.W. Brown, an agent of Chartered Bank of India, China and 
Australia, revealed that foreign banks eventually set up shop in the col- 
ony as they recognized the commercial potential in the archipelago. These 
banks provided financial intermediation services for the import-export 
trade. R.W. Brown reported that the ‘two English banks, the Hong Kong 
bank and ourselves’ have brought funds to the Philippines from credit 
abroad to finance the export trade (United States of America Philippine 
Commission 1900, p. 201). 
The foreign mercantile houses were essentially financial conduits and 
this was how American and British houses established firm footing in 
Philippine commerce. In effect, these mercantile houses introduced large- 
scale financing access to merchants that was a crucial competitive edge 
that determined supply control (Legarda 1999, pp. 256, 280, 284).12 
Notably, the Chinese were able to take advantage of this financial devel- 
opment. Americans were known for crop advances while British merchants 
were noted for making credit and loans accessible to the Chinese 
(Wickberg 1965, p. 71; Legarda 1999, p. 283). Western business firms 
also became co-signees or guarantors but they also granted credit or cash 
to Chinese merchants without requiring collateral. Promissory notes were 
likewise not required at times (Wickberg 1965, pp. 69-71, 80). In this 
sense, the Chinese struck agreements on the basis of trust. Formal paper 
work was merely a supplementary measure and more of a reflection of 
procedures.13
With the need for external financing, the Chinese needed to develop 
relationships with strategic non-Chinese parties. Repeated transactions 
facilitated the building of trust capital. Since ties that are bound by   
12 See the entire discussion in Legarda (1999, pp. 255-89), which provides 
details on how foreign merchant houses operated.
13 In Wong (1999, pp. 121-41) and Landa (1983, pp. 90-5), useful details on 
credit practices, for instance, within the Chinese community are respectively docu- 
mented in early 20th century Philippines and late 20th century Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore. It is of curious note that contemporary patterns of cooperation and 
informal sanctions are consistent with cooperative scenarios in Spanish colonial 
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British American German and Swiss French
Butler, Sykes & Co.
Peele, Hubbell 
& Co.
Peter Jenny & Co.
Augusto, Van 
Polanen Petel & Co.




J. A. Guichard & 
Sons




W.R. Patterson & 
Co.
   
Martin, Dyce & Co.    
Constable, Wood & 
Co.
   
Philips, Moore & Co.    
B.A. Barreto & Co.    
Source: Diaz Arenas, Entrega 5 as cited by Netzorg in MacMicking (1967, p. 
167).
TABLE 1
LIST OF FOREIGN MERCANTILE HOUSES IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1850
kinship or ethnicity were absent, the following factors contributed to 
the contract enforcement. First is the value of ‘face’ among the Chinese. 
Based on his experience as Governor of Hong Kong, Bowring (1963, p. 
112) astutely observed the Chinese in the Philippines and related that, 
‘the Chinese religiously respect their written, and generally their cere- 
monial, engagements― they lose face if these are dishonoured.’ Second, 
the small community of foreign merchant houses increased the severity 
of losing face, which can result in being blacklisted. Table 1 gives the 
list of foreign business houses in Manila in 1850.
Given the traffic that was present in the commercial scene of the 
Philippines, evidentiary support from historical accounts shows that the 
Chinese accessed these trade opportunities by securing credit from for- 
eign houses. The following account by MacMicking (1967, p. 19) shows 
that the foreign houses transacted heavily with the Chinese on credit.
The amount of business done by some of these Chinamen with the prin- 
cipal importers of manufactured goods, who are the British merchants, is 
very considerable, some of them frequently making monthly purchases to 
the extent of fifteen thousand dollars from one person, nearly all of the goods 
being sold to them on credits of three, four, or six months after the date of 
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purchase and delivery of the merchandise. Occasionally, however, some of 
them break down, and those importers who have been trusting them for large 
amounts, of course burn their fingers; Chinamen, as a general rule, being 
honest and trustworthy only so long as it appears to be their own interest 
to remain so.
C. From Guanxi Ties to Networks to Large-Scale Trade: Exploring 
Further Research
The previous subsection established that foreign merchant houses en- 
gaged Chinese merchants in large-scale import-export trade. Despite the 
risk of non-payment, Chinese traders were still engaged by foreign mer- 
chant houses, which in turn was made possible by large-scale credit 
(Legarda 1999; Wickberg 1965; MacMicking 1967; Loney 1967). This 
section explores the assessment of Western merchant houses towards 
Chinese commercial networks, which proved to be valuable in deciding 
to engage the Chinese in trade. 
Edwin H. Warner, a merchant from Warner, Barnes and Co. testified 
before the United States Philippine Commission in April 12, 1899 and 
related that the Chinese merchant ‘is a very good distributor of merchan- 
dise’ and acknowledges that the entire import trade ‘has all been in the 
hands of the Chinese’ (United States of America Philippine Commission 
1900-16, p. 17). 
R.W. Brown, agent of Chartered Bank of India, China and Australia 
likewise testified before the commission in June 26, 1899. Brown cor- 
roborated Warner’s statement regarding the role of the Chinese in 
import distribution and also noted Chinese ability in commerce, which 
he deemed superior to that of Filipinos (United States of America  
Philippine Commission 1900-16, p. 204). On June 27, 1899, H.D. Jones, 
in-charge of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, stressed how the 
Chinese have become indispensable in the Philippines as the entire 
commercial system is hinged on Chinese peddlers. He claimed that the 
Chinese are not only noted for their entrepreneurial importance of open- 
ing up new areas for commerce, which no other group can do. This 
underscored the use of a network (United States of America Philippine 
Commission 1900-16, p. 216). 
H. Ashton, partner of Wise & Co., on the other hand, articulated in 
June 28, 1899, that the Chinese was embedded in the commercial linkage 
between the European and American importers and the indigenous popu- 
lation. Chinese trade provided crucial intermediation services, without 
which the entire commercial operations would cease to work. Ashton 
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assess, ‘If you take away the Chinese wheel in the machinery the whole 
thing would stop’ (United States of America Philippine Commission 1900- 
16, p. 341).
In reply to the question by the Commission if almost the entire retail 
business is under Chinese control, A. Kuensle, importer of Kuensle & 
Strife provided in July 3, 1899, gave an encompassing answer regarding 
Chinese commercial activity:
　　　
Yes, sir; and also the wholesale trade for the provinces. The firms here, 
with very few exceptions, only sell in Manila and to the Chinese, who are 
the intermediaries for the provinces. They sell wholesale to the countrymen. 
... For importers and exporters it would not have been possible to do any 
work at all; in fact, the trade of the islands, small as it is compared to 
what it might be, has depended entirely upon the Chinese, because on one 
side they sell to the men in the interior, and barter with the natives for 
produce in exchange for imports-they go into the interior; they have opened 
up communication; you will see the Chinese hawker everywhere; he will go 
into the last nook and corner, and he will offer his goods and sell them, 
because if the Filipino sees a thing he must have it. The Chinaman is the 
man to develop the business. A European can not work outside here for 
any length of time (United States of America Philippine Commission 1900- 
16, pp. 228-9). 
Operational advantage from Chinese networks tipped investment in 
favor of cabecillas as the network assured an efficient distribution of im- 
ported goods and an efficient gathering of export produce. It also yielded 
savings for the foreign houses in terms of investing resources in their 
own networks, agents to be stationed in the various provinces, monitoring 
costs, retrieving provincial market information and a host of other ac- 
tivities involved in wholesaling and retailing operations in the import- 
export trade. What this section underscores is that the commercial reach 
of cabecillas throughout the archipelago, as recognized by foreign mer- 
chant houses, was contingent on the commercial relationship between 
cabecillas and agents as well as among cabecillas. In turn, the commer- 
cial relationships are characterized by guanxi, which has resulted not 
only in multi-faceted commercial cooperation but also in sanctions for 
breaking agreements. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Existing literature on the economic success of overseas Chinese in 
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contemporary Southeast Asia cite the use of guanxi as a link to pooled 
resources, labor market advantages and market entry opportunities (Lim 
and Gosling 1983; Limlingan 1986). For instance, drawing from fieldwork 
on Hokkien-Chinese rubber traders in Singapore and Western Malaysia, 
Landa (1999) develops a theory of Chinese merchant success, arguing 
that Chinese middlemen remedied the lack of state provision of needed 
infrastructure. Critical infrastructure were contract enforcement; supply 
of credit and information; and reduction of risks of bankruptcy. In various 
case studies, Chinese middlemen provided such public goods for them- 
selves.
Guanxi remains relevant in economies with underdeveloped institutions. 
Where institutions are well developed, guanxi remains relevant but with 
a non-enforcement role. This implies that the application of guanxi as a 
source of informal enforcement depends on the efficiency of formal en- 
forcement and the improvement of formal institutions of contract law. 
For instance, if at present, guanxi sanctions still constitute a robust in- 
formal enforcement mechanism just as it was during the Hispanic period, 
it indicates little improvement in the formal contract-enforcement insti- 
tutions of the Philippines. Since present conditions, while imperfect, have 
improved compared to what prevailed during the Hispanic regime, there 
is a need to qualify the use of guanxi sanctions in the contemporary 
context.
It is important to note that the human capital trade-off in utilizing 
guanxi enforcement during Spanish times was absent. Guanxi entered 
the cabecilla’s optimization problem through a positive human capital 
effect and a positive enforcement effect. But in contemporary times, the 
use of guanxi sanctions results in a trade-off. In particular, as network 
restrictedness increases, the gains from guanxi enforcement are weighed 
against the deterioration of the pooled human capital of agents (Lim 1983; 
Fabella 2005; Haley, G., Haley, U., and Tan 2009). In other words, out- 
side the extreme conditions of the predatory exchange environment in 
the Spanish era, the human capital effect of guanxi begins to be a con- 
cern. In addition, as contract law improves and the importance of non- 
Chinese capital cooperation rises, the restriction of the pool of agents 
may not be worthwhile any longer. 
The historical study shows that amidst changing institutions that govern 
economic activities, the utilization of guanxi sanctions likewise alters. 
The study shows that guanxi enforcement was successful as an informal 
contract enforcement solution because the sanctions against uncoopera- 
tive behaviour were effective. The secret of the effectiveness of these sanc- 
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tions was the fact that Confucian ethics were embedded in these strong 
particularistic ties. Sanctions for deviant behavior, which included de- 
struction of reputation, loss of trust and blacklisting, were credible 
threats (see also Landa 1981). Further study on the workings of guanxi 
in contemporary Chinese business groups can be explored. 
(Received 21 September 2012; Revised 15 February 2013; Accepted 26 
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Appendix A: Inadequate state enforcement against 
opportunism
This section adopts the model of Fabella (2009) in presenting an 
example of the dilemma in the cabecilla-agent contract. The exposition 
seeks to demonstrate the scenario when state enforcement is inade- 
quate to address agent opportunism. In this light, the model dispenses 
with moral hazard issues.  
1. Contracting parties, payments and output
The principal is the Chinese principal whom we refer to as cabecilla, 
denoted by C. The latter hires an agent A and a relationship results, 
which is governed by the principal-agent contract. C and A agree upon 
a wage denoted by w, which is to be given to A in two periods. A 
receives an outlay denoted by bw in the first period where b, given that 
0＜b＜1, is fixed and denotes the contracted proportion of w to be given 
as cash in advance. The payment in the second period is denoted by w2
＝(1－b)w.
2. Enforcement problem vis-a-vis information problem
A encounters a commitment problem that is rooted in the non- 
coinciding of wage payment and supply of effort denoted by e＝1. Since 
A already receives an initial payment without effort supply and the re- 
sulting output delivery being required at the same time to coincide with 
the initial payment, there exists an inducement for A to supply effort to 
the next best alternative. In the event that A carries this out, effort 
supply is zero, i.e. e＝0 and A gets a payoff of U
0 which is defined as 
the outsider reservation utility. Hence unenforceability of contracts does 
not stem from unobservable effort which would have resulted in moral 
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hazard problems, for which incentives would be remedial. Instead, un- 
enforceability comes from a mismatched timing of wage payment and 
effort supply. The weak or absent third party enforcement allows tenable 
contract violations. The issue here is an enforcement problem and not 
an information problem.
3. The agent’s decision to participate
What tips A’s decision to agree to C’s contract if the total utility that 
A derives from wage payments in both periods less any disutility from 
supplying the effort level that the contract requires, is higher or the 
same as the utility that A can get from the next best alternative. If A 
opts for the latter, which is an opportunity outside of C’s contract offer, 
A receives U
0, which is previously defined as the outsider reservation 
utility. The participation constraint is specified as follows: 
u(w1)＋u(w2)－v(e)≥U
0.                     (1)
where we have the additional definitions:
  u(w1)＝first period 
  u(w2)＝second period utility
  v(e)＝disutility of effort   
We assume that utility from wage payment is characterized by strict 
concavity and are twice differentiable. 
4. State retribution for contract violation
With the assumption of an existing third party enforcement embodied 
by the state, we provision for state retribution against contract violation. 
A will not violate the contract if the contract C(w, e) meets the following 
rule:
u(w1)＋u(w2)－v(e)≥U
0＋u(w1)－ϕR               (2)
where the last term follows this definition:
  ϕ＝likelihood of receiving state retribution
  R＝retribution from the state against contract violation
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Note that satisfying (2) also satisfies (1). It is necessary that (2) holds 
if state retribution is to be effective in deterring contract violation. In 
addition, the expression [u(w1)－ϕR] will exceed zero when state retri- 
bution is weak while it will be less than zero if state retribution as re- 
presented by ϕR is strong. Since u(w1) cancels out from (2), we have 
the participation constraint rewritten as,
     
u(w2)－v(e)≥U
0－ϕR.                     (3) 
5. The cabecilla makes a decision and arrives at an optimal 
contract
Following Fabella (2009), we specify below the optimization problem 
that C attempts to solve by offering A the contract, c(w, e):
　　                  　Max pF(e)－w
　　　                  
w, e
(1) 




0－ϕR.                     (3) 
We further denote (1) as the participation constraint in a strong state 
retribution context while (3) is the participation constraint that applies 
in the context of weak state retribution. The characteristics of the func- 
tion, F (e), are the same as that of the utility function with respect to 
differentiability and concavity. 
To solve the optimization problem in the context of weak state retri- 
bution, following Fabella (2009), the Lagrangean is maximized with re- 
spect to w and e. The solution is the contract c(w*, e*). Using the FOCs, 
we arrive at a positive result for the multiplier, which means that the 
participation constraint in a weak state retribution context strictly binds. 
That is, (3) holds as an equality. In the same vein of analysis, solutions 
pertaining to the FOCs and the multiplier under the strong state retri- 
bution context, yield the following results. The multiplier is strictly posi- 
tive, i.e. λ＞0, and the PC strictly binds. Further, the optimal contract 
in the strong state retribution context is c(w**, e**).1
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6. The optimal contract
Under weak third party enforcement, Fabella (2009) shows the fol- 
lowing claims. First, ‘for the same optimal effort level e**＝e*, the wage 
rate w*＞w**.’ This shows that A is better compensated under weak 
governance: U00＞U0, where U00 is the insider reservation utility. Second, 
‘a rise either in third party enforcement efficiency ϕ  or a fall in R, 
lowers w* and raises e*.’ This shows that the stronger third party en- 
forcement is, the cheaper is the fixed cash-in-advance contract for C. 
Clearly, C would be better off with good governance. On the other hand, 
the weaker governance is, A is better off getting hired. Further, exces- 
sively weak third party enforcement can lead to C backing out and to 
the disappearance of such a contract altogether. C may need additional 
mechanisms to stay in business.
　　　
Appendix B: Guanxi sanctions as a remedy for weak state 
enforcement
 
1. Effectiveness of guanxi sanctions is contingent on a restricted 
agent pool
We introduce theoretically how guanxi sanctions augment inadequate 
state enforcement through the human capital and enforcement effects. 
The exposition begins with guanxi being contingent on agent pool re- 
strictedness. In restricting the pool of agents, we adopt the framework 
of Fabella (2005) then we apply important modifications. Let g, given 
that 0≤g≤1, be the index of restrictiveness of the agent pool. When the 
agent pool is not restricted, g＝0. This implies the inclusion of the 
entire population in the pool and in effect, guanxi does not exist. In this 
respect, incorporating guanxi sanctions modifies the model through an 
enforcement effect and an aptitude effect. 
　　　
2. Guanxi is reflected in the model through the enforcement and 
aptitude effects
Enforcement effect
We first specify guanxi retribution as denoted by RG as a second 
party enforcement remedy that the cabecilla uses to remedy enforcement 
inadequacy. Guanxi enables the cabecilla to attach implicit expectations 
on the agent’s behavior. When the agent violates the contract by taking 
the initial wage payment while not supplying contracted effort, the in- 
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formal second party sanction, RG, is imposed as a punishment. RG 
augments the ineffective formal legal structure in the Parian or in the 
larger Spanish rule apparatus. Guanxi retribution is a function of agent 
pool restrictiveness, which we denote as R
G(g). Guanxi retribution in- 
creases as restriction increases, i.e. RG’＞0. Guanxi retribution reaches 
its maximum when the agent pool is absolutely restricted as expressed 
by R
G(1)＝max RG.  
Human capital effect
Following Fabella (2005), let h(g) represent human capital that is a 
function of agent pool restrictiveness.  Human capital deteriorates as g 
increases. The inverse relationship between human capital and agent 
pool restrictiveness is expressed as h’(g)≤0, where the following ex- 
tremes are expressed as h(1)＝0, h(0)＝max h. In other words, when the 
agent pool is absolutely restricted, human capital is zero. On the other 
hand, when there is no restriction, human capital is at its maximum. 
The more that the agent pool is restricted, human capital increases and 
hence, revenue increases. We therefore specify that h’(g) ≥0, h(1)＝max 
h, h(0)＝0.
3. Cabecilla’s optimization problem with guanxi sanctions
We modify C’s optimization problem to incorporate guanxi and specify 
the optimization problem, following Fabella (2005):
　                 　Max pF(e)[1＋h(g)]－w
　　　               
e, w
(4) 
　　           　s.t.  u(w2)－v(e)≥U
0－ϕR－RG(g).
where (4) is the guanxi participation constraint (GPC) in the weak state 
retribution context.  
Akin to the analysis in the previous section, we solve for the FOCs by 
maximising the Lagrangean,
L＝pF(e) [1＋h(g)]－w＋λ [u(w2)－v(e)－U
0＋ϕR－RG(g)].         (5)
C(w
G, eG) is the solution to the guanxi contract. State retribution re- 
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－1＋λ [u’(w2)(1－b)]＝0                          (6)
pF’(e) [1＋h(g)]－λv’(e)＝0                         (7)
Solving for the multiplier in (6), we find that it is strictly positive. That 
is,
λ＝[u’(w2)(1－b)]
－1＞0.                         (8)
This means that GPC binds strictly and holds as an equality. Akin to 
the analysis of the previous claims, we find that where the guanxi con- 
tract C(w
G, eG) is concerned, the agent receives his reservation utility,
U
0＋u(w1)－ϕR－R
G(g)＝U G＜U 00                     (9)
where the incentive for opportunism, u(w1)－ϕR－R
G(g), approaches zero 
despite weak state retribution i.e. low ϕR, and UG approaches equality 
with U0. Hence, guanxi has effectively taken the place of strong state 
retribution. To get C(w
G, eG), solving simultaneously for wG and eG from 
the GPC and FOCs yields wG＝w**＜w*. Optimal effort level is eG＝e**＝e*. 
As the index of restrictiveness of the guanxi agent pool, g, increases, RG 
increases, causing w
G to fall and eG to rise. We posit that a change in 
g has an unambiguous effect on the profit of the cabecilla. That is, a rise 
in g leads to a rise in RG which in turn causes wG to decrease, while a 
rise in g also leads to a rise in h(g). Both result in higher profit for the 
cabecilla. This describes the historical accounts of Chinese traders during 
the Spanish colonial context.
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